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The Disguise of Municipal Bonds: How a Safe
Bet in Investing Can Become an Unexpected
Uncertainty During Municipal Bankruptcy
ABSTRACT
When revenue is low, municipalities often use general obligation or special
revenue bonds to meet their budgetary needs. In issuing bonds,
municipalities promise to repay bondholders; however, when a
municipality files for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, repayment may be prolonged
or even precluded. Special revenue bond repayment is subject to the
“necessary operating expenses” of the municipality, as established by 11
U.S.C. § 928. However, the Bankruptcy Code leaves this phrase undefined.
This Comment attempts to assign meaning to this phrase through an
analysis of the Jefferson County, Alabama, bankruptcy. This Comment
further identifies factors that investors should consider before purchasing
municipal bonds to ensure a return on investment.
INTRODUCTION
In 2008, the housing and subprime mortgage crises caused one of the
most significant recessions this country has ever seen.1 The mortgage crisis
“slowed consumer spending, increased unemployment, and restricted credit
markets,”2 negatively affecting economic health all the way down to
individual communities.3 State and local governments experienced
massive budget gaps due to weak tax collections.4 States saw some of the

1. See CHRISTINE R. MARTELL & ADAM GREENWADE, BUECHNER INST. FOR
GOVERNANCE, AN ANALYSIS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE (2013), http://www.ucden
ver.edu/academics/colleges/SPA/spaweb/Documents/Martell%20Brief%20BIG%20Fin.pdf
(outlining the effects of the housing and subprime mortgage crisis of 2008 on the consumer and
credit markets, unemployment rates, and local government).
2. Id.
3. Michael F. Thompson, State Revenue Collection Through the Great Recession, IND.
BUS. REV., Fall 2013, at 8.
4. Phil Oliff et al., States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POL’Y PRIORITIES 1 (June 27, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/files/2-8-08sfp.pdf (“The budget
gaps result principally from weak tax collections. The Great Recession that started in 2007
caused the largest collapse in state revenues on record.”).

187

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015

1

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 7

188

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:187

lowest collected revenues in history,5 ultimately reaching an all-time low in
2010.6
Because the primary revenue source for local governments is property
tax, local governments are typically more resistant than states to
fluctuations in the economy, and they may see smaller decreases in taxrevenue collection during an economic downturn. Property tax constitutes
almost 80% of local tax collection, with income and sales taxes comprising
much smaller percentages.7 During the recession, however, falling home
prices led to lower tax values, leaving local governments with a
significantly diminished source of revenue.8
In response to the recession, many local governments implemented
measures to reduce spending. Local governments instituted “hiring and
pay freezes, pay cuts, layoffs, furloughs, early retirement incentives, and
buyouts.”9 For the debt already incurred, local governments “renegotiate[d]
debt, delay[ed] or cancel[ed] projects and contracts, and ma[de] cuts
to . . . infrastructure repairs, libraries and senior services.”10
As revenue and federal aid decreased, demand for public services
increased.11 Local governments spent a substantial amount of money
providing social, economic, and health services.12 Financially distressed
municipalities resorted to restructuring their finances, particularly through
bankruptcy.13 Filing for bankruptcy protection can help to relieve some of

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Jiri Jonas, Great Recession and Fiscal Squeeze at U.S. Subnational Government
Level 15 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 12/184, 2012), available at https://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12184.pdf.
8. Id. at 11.
9. Joshua Franzel, The Great Recession, U.S. Local Governments, and e-Government
Solutions, PM MAG., Sept. 2010, http://webapps.icma.org/pm/9208/public/pmplus1.cfm?
author=Joshua%20Franzel&title=The%20Great%20Recession%2C%20U.S.%20Local%20
Governments%2C%20and%20e-Government%20Solutions.
10. Id.
11. Jonas, supra note 7, at 10 (“The Great Recession had a severe impact on state and
local government finances . . . . At the same time, the recession ‘automatically’ increased
demand for a range of state-provided services . . .”).
12. Oliff et al., supra note 4, at 1 (explaining that “[t]he vast majority of these [budget]
shortfalls have been closed through spending cuts and other measures in order to meet
balanced-budget requirements”). Moreover, “[t]o the extent these shortfalls are being
closed with spending cuts, they are occurring on top of past years’ deep cuts in critical
public services like education, health care, and human services.” Id.
13. David A. Skeel Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 684 (2012)
(outlining six benefits of state bankruptcy and undercutting the common objections to it).
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the municipality’s financial strain, but it can cause stress and uncertainty
for bondholders.14
This Comment provides a brief overview of Chapter 9 municipal
bankruptcy. Part I discusses the history of municipal bankruptcy and
outlines the prerequisites for filing. Part II discusses two types of
municipal bonds, as well as their benefits and risks to both municipalities
and bond purchasers. Part III explores the effect of a bankruptcy filing on
municipal bonds by examining the recent municipal bankruptcy filing of
Jefferson County, Alabama, and how it handled special revenue bond
claims. Finally, Part IV highlights factors for investors to consider before
purchasing municipal bonds, in light of the Jefferson County Chapter 9
bankruptcy.
I.

MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY

Municipal bankruptcy originated in the mid-1930s as a way for
Congress to extend bankruptcy relief to municipalities.15 Congress
recognized that state and municipal governments needed access to
bankruptcy protection, especially after the financial crisis of the Great
Depression, which was felt by every level of government.16 Between 1929
and 1937, there were approximately 4,700 defaults by governmental
entities.17
To expand bankruptcy protection, however, Congress had to be
mindful of the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of the states’ right to
sovereignty over their internal affairs, including how states handle debt
acquisition and payment.18 To extend bankruptcy protection while also

14. See infra notes 71–76, 91–115 and accompanying text.
15. See Rachael E. Schwartz, This Way to the Egress: Should Bridgeport’s Chapter 9
Filing Have Been Dismissed?, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103, 114–15 (1992). Specifically, federal
law did not provide for municipal bankruptcy until 1934. Id. at 114.
16. See id. at 114–15 (explaining that the first federal bankruptcy legislation was a
direct byproduct of the Great Depression); see also Joseph M. Witalec & Mark G. Douglas,
Chapter 9 Descends Into the Sewer to Clean Up, JONES DAY 2 (Mar.–Apr. 2012),
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/c2b8d4fd-416f-4747-a330-f3b49d1a15bb/Presen
tation/PublicationAttachment/bbe7f15d-1a64-4bc3-b41dbcc48af5311a/Jefferson%20County
%20chapter%209%20BRR%20Mar_Apr%202012.pdf (providing that Congress’s decision
to implement the new federal municipal bankruptcy law was “[u]shered in during the Great
Depression to fill a vacuum that previously existed in both federal and state law”).
17. JAMES E. SPIOTTO, CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, PRIMER ON MUNICIPAL DEBT
ADJUSTMENT 3 (2012), available at http://www.afgi.org/resources/Bankruptcy_Primer.pdf.
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”); see also Witalec & Douglas, supra note 16, at 2 (suggesting that federal

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015

3

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 7

190

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:187

respecting Tenth Amendment rights, Congress created a separate chapter of
the federal Bankruptcy Code: Chapter 9.19 Chapter 9 allows a municipality
to adjust its debts in ways similar to private debtors,20 but limits the powers
of bankruptcy courts over the debt-adjustment process.21
Under Chapter 9, political subdivisions can reorganize or adjust their
debts.22 The process of reorganizing under Chapter 9 includes “extending
debt maturity dates, reducing principal or interest due on prior debts, or
refinancing existing debts with new loans or municipal bonds.”23 A
municipality can file for Chapter 9 relief only if authorized to do so under
state law.24
Once a municipality has been authorized to file a Chapter 9 petition,
the municipality must meet three eligibility requirements. First, the
municipality must be insolvent.25 According to the Bankruptcy Code, a
municipality is insolvent if it is unable to pay its current debts when they
municipal bankruptcy law is limited by the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of certain
states’ rights and the Supreme Court’s striking of the first bankruptcy law as
unconstitutional in 1936).
19. Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934, ch. 345, 48 Stat. 798, invalidated by Ashton v.
Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936). Chapter 9 was
created through an amendment to the uniform system of bankruptcy laws that applied
throughout the United States. The amendment’s purpose was to help with the “national
emergency caused by increasing financial difficulties of many local governmental units.”
Id. § 78, 48 Stat. at 798; see also Schwartz, supra note 15, at 114–15.
20. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012) (indicating that several sections of Chapter 11 on
reorganization of an individual’s debt, including sections concerning information that must
be included in the readjustment plan and how to reorganize debt, apply to Chapter 9
municipal bankruptcy).
21. Id. §§ 903–904 (limiting the power of the court to prevent it from interfering with
any political or governmental powers of the municipality).
22. Id. § 901.
23. Paul Mignano, Was GM a Municipality? Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code and the
Definitional Limit of “Government Instrumentality,” 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 529, 535 (2012).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2).
For instance, section 23-48 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides that
“any taxing district, local improvement district, school district, county, city, town or village”
may file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy with the “approval of the Local Government Commission
of North Carolina.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 23-48 (2013).
Similarly, Pennsylvania’s authorization statute requires a city of “the first class” to
get authorization from the governor before filing for Chapter 9 bankruptcy. See 53 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 12720.101 (West 2014). A city of “the first class” under
Pennsylvania’s structure is one that has a population of one million people or more. Id.
Other states require less oversight. For example, in the State of Washington, any
taxing district may file for protection under Chapter 9 as long as it adopts a resolution to
authorize the filing. See WASH. REV. CODE § 39.64.050 (2014).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3).
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become due, or if it is generally not paying its undisputed debts as they
become due.26
Second, the municipality must “desire[] to effect a plan to adjust [its]
debts.”27 Finding that a municipality has the “desire” to adjust its debts is a
highly subjective determination of intent.28 Bankruptcy courts have found
different forms of proof to be sufficient;29 generally, the municipality must
show “prepetition efforts to develop and implement a plan to avoid
bankruptcy, even if that plan eventually fails.”30
The third eligibility requirement concerns the municipality’s readjustment
plan—the municipality’s proposed method of satisfying or discharging
creditors’ claims.31 This eligibility requirement may be satisfied in one of
four ways. First, the municipality can obtain the “agreement of creditors
holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of each class that [the
municipality] intends to impair under a plan.”32 Second, even if the
municipality fails to obtain the agreement of the creditors, it may meet its
eligibility requirement if it has negotiated with those creditors in good
faith.33 Finally, if such negotiation would be impracticable,34 or if the
municipality “reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain” a
preference under 11 U.S.C. § 547,35 the municipality may be deemed to
have fulfilled its obligation. If all three of the eligibility requirements are
met, the municipality can file a petition for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, along
with a proposed debt-reorganization plan.36

26. Id. § 101(32)(C).
27. Id. § 109(c)(4).
28. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 171 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (engaging in an
in-depth evaluation of Detroit’s “desire,” through a discussion of potential ulterior motives
as well as the possibility of impairing pensions).
29. Compare In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 607 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995)
(proposing a comprehensive settlement agreement, among other steps taken that
demonstrated efforts to resolve claims which satisfied § 109(c)(4)), with In re Sullivan Cnty.
Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 76 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994) (holding that a
postpetition submission of a draft plan of adjustment met the requirements of § 109(c)(4)).
30. Mignano, supra note 23, at 536.
31. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.02[2][d], at 900-22 to -23 (Alan N. Resnick &
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2014).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)(A).
33. Id. § 109(c)(5)(B).
34. Id. § 109(c)(5)(C).
35. Id. § 109(c)(5)(D).
36. Lauren M. Wolfe, Comment, The Next Financial Hurricane? Rethinking Municipal
Bankruptcy in Louisiana, 72 LA. L. REV. 555, 565 (2012) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)).
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Once a municipality files a Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition, the
bankruptcy court issues an automatic stay,37 halting all actions to enforce
claims for debt, including enforcement of liens on taxes owed.38 Although
the stay and plan of adjustment under Chapter 9 are beneficial to a
municipality, the effect on bondholders is considerably less favorable.39
II. MUNICIPAL BONDS
A local government’s ability to meet its obligations varies based on
the services that its residents need, as well as the amount of revenue that it
collects. Tax revenue is one of the largest sources of revenue for most state
and local governments.40 During an economic downturn, tax revenues
decline, forcing local governments to operate with less funding.41 Adding
to the financial strain, most state and local governments are required by law
to maintain balanced budgets.42 This requirement places a restriction on
spending that makes it difficult for governments to pay for day-to-day
operations, public services, and the maintenance and upkeep of
infrastructure.43 Further, state and local governments are required to
provide “basic infrastructure, education, and health and safety services at

37. 11 U.S.C. § 922(a).
38. Id.
39. Famose T. Garner, Comment, Putting the Honest Back in “Honest but Unfortunate
Debtor”: A Debtor’s Duty to Report a Beneficial Change in Circumstances, 47 HOUS. L.
REV. 105, 130 (2010) (explaining that some debtors have abused the Code as a means of
avoiding debt repayment, and that under the current laws, a debtor does not have to report a
beneficial change in income, providing a “‘head start’ instead of a ‘fresh start’” for the
debtor).
40. Indeed, taxes accounted for almost 40% of local-government revenues in 2011. See
Christine Sgarlata Chung, Government Budgets as the Hunger Games: The Brutal
Competition for State and Local Government Resources Given Municipal Securities Debt,
Pension and OBEP Obligations, and Taxpayer Needs, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 663, 676
(2014) [hereinafter Chung, Hunger Games].
41. These periods of decreased revenue often correspond with a need to expand
community services. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF:
FISCAL STRESS FACED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 2 (2010), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/
files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/120xx/doc12005/12-09-municipalities_brief.pdf.
42. Peter Molk, Comment, Broadening the Use of Municipal Mortgages, 27 YALE J. ON
REG. 397, 398 (2010) (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-122 (West 2008) (requiring
municipalities to set taxes to balance budgets); Ronald K. Snell, State Balanced Budget
Requirements: Provisions and Practice, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.
org/research/fiscal-policy/state-constitutional-and-statutory-requirements-fo.aspx (last updated Mar. 2004) (noting that forty-nine states have balanced-budget requirements)).
43. Chung, Hunger Games, supra note 40, at 671–74 (discussing the tension between
state and local governments’ obligations to provide public services with limited revenue).
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all times,”44 which means that certain budget cuts or downsizing are not
always possible.45
With restricted funding and balanced-budget requirements, local
governments have to resort to other sources of funding, mainly by issuing
municipal bonds.46 A municipal bond is defined as “a type of interestbearing debt instrument issued by state or local governments to fund certain
types of financial needs.”47 Historically, municipalities issue two types of
bonds: general obligation bonds and special revenue bonds.48 The
difference between the two types of bonds is the type of collateral used to
secure payments of interest and principal, and the types of risk that the
bonds carry.49 The two types of bonds are discussed in more detail below.
A.

General Obligation Bonds

General obligation bonds are debt instruments issued by state and
local governments to raise funds for public projects.50 A general obligation
bond is a tool used by municipalities to raise money for projects and
services that will not provide a source of revenue, such as roads, bridges,
parks, and equipment.51 State and local law determine how general
obligation bonds are secured and what funds are used for their repayment.52
Typically, general obligation bonds are secured by the municipality’s “full
faith and credit,”53 meaning that the municipality has committed to use all
available revenue resources through its general revenue powers to pay the
principal and interest of the bond.54 Essentially, the municipality promises
44. Id. at 672.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 683.
47. Arthur Flynn, Note, The Life and Premature Death of BABS: A Proposal to
Reinstate the Subsidized Taxable Municipal Bond, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 673,
676 (2012) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 76 (3d pocket ed. 2006)).
48. Id. at 677 (citing Randle B. Pollard, Who’s Going to Pick Up the Trash?—Using the
Build America Bond Program to Help State and Local Governments’ Cash Deficits, 8 PITT.
TAX REV. 171, 178 (2011)).
49. See id. at 677 n.39 (citing Pollard, supra note 28, at 178–79).
50. Id. at 676–77.
51. Id.; see also MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., SPECIAL COMMENT: U.S. MUNICIPAL BOND
DEFAULTS AND RECOVERIES, 1970-2011, at 2 (2012), http://www.nhhefa.com/
documents/moodysMunicipalDefaultStudy1970-2011.pdf (stating that general obligation
bonds are sold to fund projects that improve the physical infrastructure of a municipality).
52. NAT’L ASS’N BOND LAWYERS, GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS: STATE LAW,
BANKRUPTCY AND DISCLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS 13 (2014), http://www.nabl.org/uploads/c
ms/documents/GENERAL_OBLIGATION_MUNICIPAL_BONDS.pdf.
53. Id. at 2.
54. Id. at 2–3.
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to use its power to levy taxes in order to meet the general obligation bonds
when they become due.55 The taxing power used to meet this obligation
varies depending on the municipality’s laws.56 Some municipalities may
secure general obligation bonds with property taxes,57 which allows the
municipality to raise property taxes if other sources of revenue are
insufficient to pay for the general obligation debt.58
General obligation bonds are considered the best investment among
municipal bonds.59 Because they are secured by full faith and credit,
investors are ensured that their bonds will be repaid, even if the
municipality has to raise its taxes.60 A municipality’s ability to raise its
taxes to repay general obligation bonds lowers the occurrence of defaults
and lowers the risk of loss to investors.61
General obligation bonds are beneficial to a municipality as well, but
are limited in their ability to help with the municipality’s need for
additional funding. Many municipalities have a statutory cap on the amount
of debt that the municipality is allowed to incur, and general obligation
bonds typically count toward this cap.62 Considering the recent recession,
the maximum amount that can be borrowed may be much less than the
amount that the municipality needs. When the municipality reaches its

55. KROLL BOND RATINGS, NOT ALL G.O. BONDS ARE CREATED EQUAL 3–4 (2013),
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/seminars/2014/20140205/kroll.pdf (defining general
obligation bonds, which, depending on the level of government that issues the bond, can be
secured by a limited or an unlimited property tax rate, the general fund, or by guaranteed
debt and discussing the corresponding taxing power that comes with each type of general
obligation bond as well as what risks these bonds pose on the issuing local government’s
credit rating).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 3.
59. See Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Securities: The Crisis of State and Local
Government Indebtedness, Systemic Costs of Low Default Rates, and Opportunities for
Reform, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455, 1465, 1469 (2013) [hereinafter Chung, Municipal
Securities] (arguing that regulations are concerned with risk and municipal markets, but that
the risks to issuers and taxpayers should be instead regulated by federal securities laws).
60. Id. at 1469 (“Although default rates tend to be higher for revenue bonds, issuers’
obligation to tap dedicated revenues has kept default rates (and thus investor losses) in
relative check.”).
61. Id. at 1470. General obligation bonds are used “to finance public facilities that do
not produce revenues, or when it is thought to be inappropriate to levy fees for use as a
matter of public policy.” Id. at 1466.
62. For example, Illinois prohibits any municipality with a population of less than half a
million people from incurring a total debt exceeding “8.625% of the value of the taxable
property” within that municipality. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-5-1 (2012).
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debt limit, it must look for other forms of financing, such as special
revenue bonds.63
B.

Special Revenue Bonds

Special revenue bonds are debt instruments that are issued to fund
public works and infrastructure projects that are designed to improve the
municipality.64 Under the Bankruptcy Code, “special revenue” includes
any receipts, special excise taxes, or other revenues derived from projects
or systems of the municipality that are primarily used to provide
transportation, utility, and other services that are owned, operated, or
disposed of by the municipality.65 For example, projects that may be built
or improved with special revenue bonds include toll roads and sewer
systems.66 Although the revenues received are part of general taxes levied
by the municipality, this revenue is attributable to the improvements of the
financed project.67
Special revenue bonds are secured “only by the revenue stream
generated from a distinct source, usually the underlying project the bonds
are used to finance.”68 Since these bonds are self-funded by an identifiable
revenue stream that is not based on the municipality’s usual tax collections,
such as property and income taxes, special revenue bonds do not count
toward a municipality’s statutory debt limit.69 Because these bonds have a
limited revenue source and, thus, carry a higher risk of default, the bonds

63. Molk, supra note 42, at 399. Molk suggests:
Many municipalities have ceilings on the amount of debt they can incur.
Typically, general obligation bonds count toward this ceiling, but [special]
revenue bonds do not. Revenue bonds thus offer an important form of financing
if municipalities approach or break through their debt ceiling. Because pure
revenue bonds are self-funded by an identified revenue stream, they do not count
as debt . . . .
Id.
64. Mignano, supra note 23, at 537 (“Special revenue bonds remain secured and
serviced during the pendency of the [C]hapter 9 case. These special revenue bonds are often
distributed in order to fund public works such as hospitals, stadiums, or other public
infrastructure projects.”).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 902(2) (2012).
66. Chung, Municipal Securities, supra note 59, at 1466; SPIOTTO, supra note 17, at 29
(defining “special revenues” and providing examples of each of the five types of special
revenues as set out in 11 U.S.C. § 902(2)).
67. SPIOTTO, supra note 17, at 29.
68. Molk, supra note 42, at 399.
69. Id. at 399–400.
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incur higher interest rates.70 The higher interest rates and the security of
the project itself appeal to investors.71 Despite the higher risk of default,
investors will see the link between how their money is used to improve the
municipality and repayment of the special revenue bonds, increasing their
confidence in purchasing these bonds.72
III. MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY’S EFFECT ON MUNICIPAL BONDS
When a municipality files for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, what once
seemed to be a good investment can become a significant loss for
bondholders. General obligation bondholders and special revenue
bondholders are given different priority,73 which determines whether the
bondholders will receive payment on their investment in the municipality
during the stay and after the municipality readjusts its debt.74
General obligation bonds are treated as part of the municipality’s
“general debt.”75 Those who have been issued general obligation bonds are
treated as general unsecured creditors during the bankruptcy process.76
After a municipality has filed for bankruptcy and a stay has been placed on
all payments to creditors, payments on bonds will be stayed as well.77
Creditors holding special revenue bonds, however, fare much better than
those who hold general obligation bonds during a Chapter 9 bankruptcy.

70. Chung, Municipal Securities, supra note 59, at 1466 n.37 (quoting ROBERT L.
BLAND, A BUDGETING GUIDE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT 171 (2007)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Priority determines which creditor, or class of creditors, gets paid first and how
much they get repaid. See Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Pensions and Property
Rights in Municipal Bankruptcy, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 609, 613 (2014) (“Creditors
with claims having equal priority share equally in proportion to their claims.” (citing
Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 667 (2006); Sampsell v.
Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 177–78
(1977))). As explained above in this Comment, the Bankruptcy Code grants some creditors
higher priority than others. Secured creditors, such as special revenue bondholders, are
given higher priority than general, unsecured creditors, like general obligation
bondholders—meaning, special revenue holders will be paid before general obligation
bondholders. Id.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 928 (2012); see Mignano, supra note 23, at 537 (“General obligation
bondholders are treated as general creditors, holding claims to be redeemed in the
bankruptcy process. Special revenue bonds remain secured and serviced during the
pendency of the [C]hapter 9 case.”).
75. 11 U.S.C. §§ 552, 928(a); S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 4–5 (1988).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 928; Mignano, supra note 23, at 537; SPIOTTO, supra note 17, at 32.
77. SPIOTTO, supra note 17, at F-3.
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Special revenue bonds remain secured and are paid during the
pendency of a Chapter 9 bankruptcy case.78 The Bankruptcy Code, in a
sense, rewards investors who have helped fund projects that will improve
the municipality through providing these bonds with priority.79 The Code
provides that any prepetition pledge or obligation terminates upon the filing
of a Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition, but only as to property acquired after
the filing of the petition.80 However, rights to proceeds of the property
subject to the lien, such as the project securing special revenue bonds, are
not terminated.81 In the case of special revenue bonds, “the security
interest in ‘special revenues’ remains valid and enforceable even though
such revenues are received after a Chapter 9 filing.”82 Thus, special
revenue bondholders continue to receive payment on those bonds, despite
the bankruptcy filing.83
Although special revenue bondholders receive priority, repayment of
these bonds can still be uncertain. Repayment of special revenue bonds is
subject to § 928(b), which exempts the “necessary operating expenses” of
the project or system that was financed by the bonds.84 However, the
Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly define which costs are “necessary
operating expenses” of a municipal project.85 Consequently, the phrase is
open to subjective interpretations, “ranging from something that is
absolutely needed to something that is needed, but not essential.”86
Since “necessary operating expenses” has not been defined in the
Bankruptcy Code, municipalities must look to other sources, such as
legislative history, to determine what expenses will receive priority over all
other payments to creditors and bondholders. The legislative history of
Chapter 9 suggests that “necessary operating expenses” are those expenses
that are “necessary to keep the project or system going and producing
special revenues.”87 Prepetition operating expenses may qualify as

78. 11 U.S.C. § 928; Mignano, supra note 23, at 537.
79. Mignano, supra note 23, at 537.
80. SPIOTTO, supra note 17, at 26.
81. Id. Although the Bankruptcy Code does not directly define what constitutes
“proceeds,” and the term has not been addressed in case law, amendments to the Code
provide clarity as to what the term “proceeds” includes. Id.
82. Id. at 27.
83. Id.
84. 11 U.S.C. § 928(b) (2012).
85. See id. §§ 101, 928(b) (emphasis added).
86. Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Jefferson Cnty. (In re Jefferson Cnty.) (Jefferson II), 474
B.R. 725, 752 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.), amended, 482 B.R. 404 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012).
87. F COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 31, app. pt. 41(g)(ii)(A), at 41-130
(providing the legislative history of the 1988 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code).
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“necessary operating expenses,” but the legislative history reflects that a
court can ultimately determine whether these prepetition expenses are truly
necessary for the purpose of generating special revenues.88
The lack of guidance from the Code as to what constitutes a
“necessary operating expense” has recently led to litigation and, as a result,
has provided an interpretation of the term. Analysis of the recent litigation
can provide investors with insight as to what constitutes a “necessary
operating expense,” helping them to make better investment decisions the
next time they have the opportunity to purchase special revenue bonds.
A.

Municipal Bankruptcy in Jefferson County, Alabama

The Jefferson County bankruptcy resulted from the loss of a large part
of the county’s tax revenue, which exacerbated the municipality’s immense
preexisting debt.89 In March 2011, the Supreme Court of Alabama struck
down a business license and occupation tax as improperly implemented by
the state’s legislature.90 Along with this loss of revenue, which amounted
to approximately $50 million,91 Jefferson County was facing almost $4
billion of previously incurred debt.92 Most of the debt came from
borrowing money in the late 1990s and early 2000s in the form of special
revenue bonds to finance the construction and repair of the county’s sewer
system.93
The Jefferson County sewer system had drastically grown in size, with
the county acquiring over twenty sewer systems from the local governments of
both small towns and large cities.94 The county acquired the sewers
without first determining the condition of these systems, most of which
were improperly maintained.95 Using special revenue bonds to make the
appropriate repairs to the newly enlarged sewer system caused the county
to sink further into debt, and prevented spreading the costs of the repairs

88. See id.
89. In re Jefferson Cnty. (Jefferson I), 474 B.R. 228, 236 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012).
90. Jefferson Cnty. v. Weissman, 69 So. 3d 827, 844–45 (Ala. 2011) (holding that the
tax was improperly advertised because the legislature failed to publish four consecutive
weekly notices in the affected counties before introducing the bill).
91. Updates from the State House, LEGIS. UPDATE (Birmingham Bus. Alliance,
Birmingham, Ala.), Apr. 1, 2011, at 1, http://www.birminghambusinessalliance.com/up
loads/PDFs/BBALegislativeUpdate.Newsletter.Issue5.pdf.
92. Jefferson I, 474 B.R. at 237.
93. Id.
94. Id.; see also Robin Smith, Southern Discomfort: An Examination of the Financial
Crisis in Jefferson County, Alabama, 10 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 363, 365 (2010).
95. Jefferson I, 474 B.R. at 237; see also Smith, supra note 94, at 366.
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across everyone in the county96 in the form of taxes, fees, assessments, and
general obligation bonds.97 Instead, the sewer bonds were to be repaid by
the revenues of a sewer system that was in desperate need of repair.98
The county soon realized that the sewer-system revenue would not
cover the payments that had become due on the special revenue bonds. By
February 2008, Jefferson County had defaulted on the warrants.99 Two
months later, the county could not make principal payments on the
bonds.100 By April, the county and the bondholders had entered into an
agreement of forbearance of special revenue bond payments.101 After years
of trying to restructure the debt by laying off hundreds of employees,
closing facilities, eliminating overtime, and cutting work hours,102 Jefferson
County filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy in November 2011.103
Despite the bankruptcy filing, the county was still required to make
payments on the special revenue bonds with the returns that the sewer
system generated during the bankruptcy stay.104 However, a dispute arose
between a trustee of the special revenue bondholders and the county.105
The trustee and the county disagreed as to which expenses should be
considered “necessary operating expenses.”106 The county wanted to use

96. Jefferson I, 474 B.R. at 238.
97. Id. at 238–39.
98. Id. at 239 (“When sewer usage charges increase beyond a point, the ability of the
county to obtain revenue from other sources for other purposes is constrained . . . the
payment of increasing sewer charges takes monies from its residents that might otherwise
have been available via taxes, assessments, fees, or other means.”); see also David A.
Rosenzweig & Stanford G. Ladner, The Latest in Jefferson County, LAW360 (July 12, 2012,
7:27 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/359720/the-latest-in-jefferson-county.
99. Jefferson I, 474 B.R. at 241.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 244–45.
103. Voluntary Petition, In re Jefferson Cnty., No. 11-05736-TBB9 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
Nov. 9, 2011); see also Lawrence A. Larose & Robert J. Gayda, Chadbourne & Parke LLP,
Treatment of Special Revenue Bonds in Chapter 9: Where Are We After In re Jefferson
County, Alabama?, Presentation at the American Bankruptcy Institute 2014 Annual Spring
Meeting, in Business Track: Municipal Bankruptcies, AM. BANKR. INST., Apr. 2014, 213,
214, http://materials.abi.org/sites/default/files/2014/Apr/MunicipalBankruptcies.pdf.
104. Jefferson II, 474 B.R. 725, 730 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.), amended, 482 B.R. 404 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 2012).
105. Id.
106. The parties disagreed as to “what expenditures for the County’s sewer system
[were] payable ahead of payments to those lenders who/which secured payment of interest
and principal owed” to the special revenue bonds. Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Jefferson Cnty.
(In re Jefferson Cnty.) (Jefferson III), 482 B.R. 404, 408 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012);
Rosenzweig & Ladner, supra note 98.
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$4.5 million of the sewer revenue each month to pay for professional fees
consisting primarily of attorney’s fees relating to the bankruptcy
proceedings and negotiations with bondholders, as well as for depreciation
and amortization, and for future operating expenses and capital expenditures.107
The trustee argued that these were not “necessary operating expenses”
because under the contract governing the trustee’s duties, only the
expenditures incurred and for which payment is due in the current month
constituted expenditures that could be taken from the sewer-system
revenues.108
To resolve the conflict between the trustee and Jefferson County, the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama had
to determine the meaning of “necessary operating expenses.”109 In doing
so, the court first looked to the legislative history of the 1988 amendments
to the Bankruptcy Code, which created the “necessary operating expenses”
exception.110 The court noted that when reviewing the legislative history of
a statute, it is important to determine the purpose of the statute.111 Further,
the court explained that the legislative history reflected Congress’s desire
to ensure special “revenue bondholders receive the benefit of their bargain
with the municipal issuer [and that] they will have unimpaired rights to the
project revenues pledged to them.”112 However, the report of the United
States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary indicated that
the pledged revenues for special revenue bonds are not to be affected by a
stay of bankruptcy as long as it is consistent with the amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code, including the “necessary operating expenses”

107. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 409–10; Rosenzweig & Ladner, supra note 98.
108. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 410, 414.
109. Id. at 431; see also Rosenzweig & Ladner, supra note 98.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 928(b) (2012) (“Any such lien on special revenues, other than
municipal betterment assessments, derived from a project or system shall be subject to the
necessary operating expenses of such project or system, as the case may be.”); H.R. REP.
NO. 100-1011, at 8 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4115, 4122 (“New subsection
928(b) ensures that in the case of project financing . . . or system financing . . . the lien on
special revenues will be subordinate to the necessary operating expenses of the project or
system.”).
111. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 432; Witalec & Douglas, supra note 16 (“According to the
[Jefferson County] court, excerpts from the legislative history of amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code in 1998 . . . were intended to preserve creditors’ liens on municipal special
revenues that might otherwise be avoided . . . .”).
112. S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 12 (1988) (“[T]he [1988] amendments insure that revenue
bondholders receive the benefit of their bargain with the municipal issuer, namely, they will
have unimpaired rights to the project revenue pledged to them.”).
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exception.113 Thus, the court concluded, “Congress contemplated leaving a
pledge of special revenues unaffected unless it is at odds with the policies”
in the Bankruptcy Code’s exception.114
According to the Senate Report, a policy of the amendments was that
special revenues be used to “keep the system or project operating followed
by payment of interest and principal to lenders.”115 Keeping the system or
project operating includes funds necessary to both repay the bondholders
and to deliver services to customers.116 According to the House Report,
“payment of operating expenses—those necessary to keep the project or
system going—must be protected so that the project or system can be
maintained in good condition to generate the [revenue] to repay
bondholders.”117 After reviewing the legislative records, the court indicated
that the perimeter of “necessary operating expenses” includes expenses that
are “expended to keep the system or project operating in the sense
that . . . [it] is kept in good repair and generating the special revenues, not
improvements or enhancements,” as well as those that are “directly related
to the project or system.”118 Necessary operating expenses also include
“some, but not all operating expenses, which flow from § 928(b) being a
minimum standard” and those that are “being paid, which is different from
those that may be incurred and paid in a later time period.”119 Overall, the
consideration of what would constitute “necessary operating expenses”
should be, “whether the contracted for pledge allows the system during the
pendency of the municipal bankruptcy to continue to operate, be in good
condition, and generate revenues for debt repayment. It is not that it is the

113. Id. at 11 (“The automatic stay should specifically be inapplicable to application of
[pledge revenues for secured bonds].”); Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 434; see also Witalec &
Douglas, supra note 16, at 5 (“However, [§] 922(d) excludes certain acts from the scope of
the stay under [§] 922(a) by providing that ‘[n]otwithstanding [§] 362 of this title and
subsection (a) of this section, a petition filed under this chapter does not operate as a stay of
application of pledged special revenues in a manner consistent with [§] 927 of this title to
payment of indebtedness secured by such revenues.’” (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 922(d))).
114. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 434.
115. Id.; S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 22.
116. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 437; S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 22.
117. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 437; H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 8 (1988), reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4115, 4122.
118. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 437.
119. Id.; see Larose & Gayda, supra note 103, at 218 (“[T]he Court found that
‘necessary operating expenses’ meant expenses necessary to keep the sewer system
operating and to maintain it in good, not perfect, condition so that the system could generate
revenue necessary to repay the Sewer Warrants and to provide service to the residents of the
municipality.”).
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best possible operation, the best maintained, or the best of any possible
criteria.”120
The Jefferson County court also noted that a bankruptcy court should
avoid an item-by-item determination of what constitutes a “necessary
operating expense.”121 What a system needs to remain in operation is a
business judgment of the municipality and the lenders.122 That assessment
should not be second-guessed by a bankruptcy court unless there is
evidence of unreasonableness or certainty that the § 928(b) standard has not
been met.123 Bankruptcy courts should defer to the agreement between the
parties as expressed in their contract.124
The Jefferson County court noted the absence of a discussion of
capital expenses and capital expenditures in both the House and Senate
Reports.125 The omission of capital expenses is significant in determining
whether those expenses were to be included as part of “necessary operating
expenses,” the court reasoned, because, just a few months prior to the
House and Senate’s review of the proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code, these expenses had previously received a great deal of attention by
the Report on the National Bankruptcy Conference on Proposed Municipal
Bankruptcy Amendments.126 The absence of a discussion on capital
expenditures and expenses indicated that Congress did not intend for these
expenses to be considered as “necessary operating expenses” of a project or
system.127
Overall, the court found that neither depreciation and amortization nor
capital expenses and capital expenditures are “necessary operating expenses.”128
The 1988 amendments were created to ensure that special revenues were
used to pay the special revenue bondholders.129 The county’s plan to take
$3.6 million per month would hinder this purpose.130 Further, capital

120. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 441.
121. Id. at 440.
122. Id. at 441.
123. Id. at 442–43.
124. Id. at 443.
125. Id. at 438; see also S. REP. NO. 100-506 (1988); H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4115, 4122.
126. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 435 (“This National Bankruptcy Conference report was
part of the floor speeches of the two members of Congress who introduced the bills in their
respective chambers.”); see also 133 C ONG. REC. S16229 (Nov. 12, 1987) (statement of
Sen. DeConcini); 134 CONG. REC. H77 (Feb. 2, 1988) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
127. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 435.
128. Id. at 439; see also Larose & Gayda, supra note 103, at 216.
129. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 439; S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 5–7.
130. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 439.
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expenses and expenditures are not the daily expenses required to keep the
sewer system in operation during the time the county is in Chapter 9
proceedings.131 Finally, although depreciation and amortization are
expenses, they were not current operating expenses that would keep the
sewer system operating.132
The court considered whether the county could deduct professional
fees before making special revenue bond payments.133 There were two
types of professional fees and related costs at issue. The first type of
professional fees are the “fees and costs directly related to the efficient and
economical administration of the sewer system exclusive of those related to
the county’s chapter 9 bankruptcy case,”134 which all parties agreed were
properly payable ahead of special revenue bond payments. The second
type includes all other professional fees, mostly those related to the
county’s Chapter 9 case, totaling over $830,000 per month,135 and which
were disputed. The court explained that “legal services are never a frill or
an extra; they are fundamental to the efficient development of a
reorganization plan.”136 Thus, the court held that the professional fees in
Jefferson County were “necessary operating expense[s]” that could be paid
prior to payment of special revenue bonds.137
B.

Lessons Learned from Jefferson County

Jefferson County can provide guidance to investors as to the type of
bonds in which to invest and the information to consider prior to making
that investment. In addition to looking at interest rates and the security
backing the bonds, investors should consider how municipal bankruptcy
can change the risk of their investment based on the type of security

131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Mark N. Berman, A Crack in the Armor of the Special Revenue Bond, BANKR. L.
ALERT 3 (July 31, 2013), http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/157872_Bankruptcy_Alert
_31JULY2013.pdf (discussing the three Jefferson County decisions to explain the rights of
special revenue bondholders, the indenture between the county and its bankruptcy trustee,
and the risk to special revenue bondholders of losing priority to professional fees after the
Jefferson County decisions).
134. Jefferson III, 482 B.R. at 409.
135. Id. at 410.
136. Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Jefferson Cnty. (In re Jefferson Cnty.) (Jefferson IV), 503
B.R. 849, 900 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2013); see also Berman, supra note 132, at 4 (recognizing
Chief Judge Bennett’s finding that professional fees are necessary expenses for § 928(b)
purposes).
137. Jefferson IV, 503 B.R. at 902–03.
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provided, the purpose of the bond, and the kinds of fees that are related to
the bond.
First, investors should research the bond under consideration and
understand the condition of the security, if the bond is secured. As
Jefferson County illustrates, the condition of the security is an important
indicator of a municipality’s ability to honor its obligation after filing for
bankruptcy.138 This is especially true for special revenue bonds, which rely
on the amount of revenue that is generated by the underlying project or
system. If the special revenue bond-financed project is in poor condition
and requires costly maintenance, the revenue that it generates will be
needed for the maintenance and improvement of the project.139 Upon filing
for bankruptcy, this revenue will be used for that maintenance—a
“necessary operating expense”—rather than paying back the bond.140 Thus,
although special revenue bondholders receive payments during a
municipal-bankruptcy stay, this privilege may be undercut by high costs of
improvement and maintenance of the secured project.141
Second, investors should consider the professional fees that will be
needed for a project to maintain operations, including legal fees associated
with potential bankruptcy filings. In a bankruptcy filing, both types of
professional fees—operational maintenance and litigation—receive priority
over special-resource bond payments.142 Litigation fees would likely cut
into the funds available to make payments on special revenue bonds.143 As
for general obligation bonds, if a municipality is negatively affected by a
downturn in the economy, it may have to provide more services, but with
lower revenue collections, and may not be able to raise taxes high enough
to cover its operational maintenance costs.
Third, special revenue bondholders should also find comfort in two
main components of the Jefferson County court’s interpretation of
“necessary operating expenses.” The first component is that the court
138. See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text.
139. See Berman, supra note 133, at 3 (discussing Chief Judge Bennett’s finding that
operating expenses included those funds necessary to maintain the sewer system in good
enough condition so that it can generate revenue to repay bondholders and, obviously, to
continue to provide services to the community).
140. Id.
141. See 11 U.S.C. § 928(b) (2012) (“Any such lien on special revenues, other than
municipal betterment assessments, derived from a project or system shall be subject to the
necessary operating expenses of such project or system, as the case may be.”).
142. Jefferson IV, 503 B.R. at 902–03 (finding that attorney’s fees were necessary
operating expenses).
143. As seen in Jefferson County, the litigation fees can be enormous. The attorney’s
fees in Jefferson County amounted to nearly three quarters of a million dollars per month.
See Jefferson III, 482 B.R. 404, 410 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012).
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required the expenses to be current expenses.144 The time limitation placed
on municipal expenses prevents a municipality from deducting costs that
may arise in the future in order to buffer any possible future negative
consequences.145 Special revenue bondholders, in turn, do not have to
worry about expenses they cannot anticipate before the municipality files
for bankruptcy.146
As for the second component, the Jefferson County court required
“necessary operating expenses” to be limited in scope.147 Only the
expenses that keep the project operating in good—not optimum—condition
and generating revenue will be given priority over the special revenue
bondholders’ claims. Although the municipality’s judgment receives
deference,148 evidence of unreasonable spending can be raised when there
is a bankruptcy filing, forcing the bankruptcy court to review the
legitimacy of the municipality’s priority claim and providing special
revenue bondholders further protection of their claims.149
Finally, despite the risks associated with special revenue bonds,
potential bond investors should remember that the Bankruptcy Code favors
special revenue bondholders. When Congress amended the Bankruptcy
Code, it created unique privileges for special revenue bondholders to
reward them for investing in a municipality.150 All claims during a
municipal bankruptcy case will be considered in light of this purpose and
should earn these bondholders—and their priority claims—favor with the
court.151
144. Id. at 439 (deciding that depreciation and amortization were expenses, but were not
necessary operating expenses because they were not part of the day-to-day expenses needed
to keep the sewer system functioning).
145. Id.
146. See Berman, supra note 133, at 4–5 (arguing that unless municipalities take care to
draft concise definitions in their contracts with trustees as to what expenses can be paid out
of project revenues, bondholders’ priority in repayment may be subject to the legal fees
incurred by the municipality’s bankruptcy proceedings).
147. See id. at 3 (noting Chief Judge Bennett’s finding that funds needed to keep the
sewer in good—but not perfect—condition were “necessary operating expenses”).
148. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
149. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 171 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (reviewing the
petitioner’s subjective desire to restructure its debts before confirming the municipality’s
bankruptcy plan).
150. S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 12 (1988); H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 8 (1988), reprinted
in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4115, 4122; SPIOTTO, supra note 17, at 23 (discussing Senate reports
indicating that Congress wanted special revenue bondholders to be rewarded for investing in
the municipality); see also supra note 95 and accompanying text.
151. S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 12; H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 8, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4122; SPIOTTO, supra note 17, at 26–28 (discussing Senate reports indicating that Congress
intended to “[make] clear that revenue bondholders are entitled to receive the revenues
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CONCLUSION
Municipal bonds, both general obligation bonds and special revenue
bonds, are beneficial in helping municipalities find funding for their daily
operations as well as revenue-generating projects. However, these bonds
come with the risk that a financially distressed municipality will file for
Chapter 9 bankruptcy. General obligation bonds do not have to be paid
during the bankruptcy proceedings, while special revenue bonds enjoy
continued investment and principal payments.152 The “necessary operating
expenses” of projects financed by special revenue bonds, however, can
overshadow the benefit of the continued payments of special revenue bonds
during municipal-bankruptcy proceedings.
Although “necessary operating expenses” has not been defined in the
Bankruptcy Code, the recent Jefferson County opinions provide insight into
what Congress intended the phrase to mean. Operating and maintenance
costs and professional fees, excluding capital and future expenses, are the
only fees intended to take priority over special revenue bond payments.
Investors can look to the Jefferson County bankruptcy to assess the risks
they face when a municipality files for bankruptcy.
MaryJane Richardson*

pledged to them without any interference and on a timely basis”); see also supra notes 95–
97 and accompanying text.
152. SPIOTTO, supra note 17, at 27.
* J.D. Candidate 2015, Campbell University School of Law. The author would like
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